The defining feature of minds is cogitation. Therefore, 7 Minds are not bodies, and bodies are not minds. That is to say, there are at least two distinct kinds of existents:
So, the question only really arises for type-identity; where, for instance, "seeing green" is always identical with a particular type of neurological state.
But then the question is, how do you distinguish these different types of neurological experience? Maybe animals have similar enough neurology to humans that we could say their neurological states are of the same "type.
We could also imagine intelligent aliens, who would presumably have a very different neurology to humans; but, maybe there are analogies between human biology and alien biology if, for instance, the aliens need oxygen, and they have some organ that pumps an oxygenated fluid around their body, we could call that organ a "heart," even if it's not all that similar to a human heart.
In this case, we might be able to come up with a way in which alien neurological occurrences are of the same type as human neurological occurrences. Again, the mind-brain identity theory might be able to apply to non-humans.
The final example that comes to mind is intelligent computers.
They don't have neurology at all, so if we wanted to find a "type" of state that was identical to an experience, we would have to define it in non-neurological terms.
The obvious candidate is to define the relevant state in functional terms, but it's not obvious to me at that point that we are still dealing with the mind-brain identity theory. So, the short answer would be that versions of the mind-brain identity theory can avoid human-chauvanism, but they have a harder time avoiding Earth-chauvanism, and a harder time avoiding biological chauvinism.
· Blutner/Philosophy of Mind/Mind & Body/Identity Theory 2 Mind-brain correlations Common observations (alcohol and other drugs) and neuropsychological evidence (electro- Dualism) 2. The correlations are the result of epiphenomenal by-products of neural activity (like the Blutner/Philosophy of Mind/Mind & Body/Identity Theory 8 Type vs iridis-photo-restoration.com Mind–body dualism, or mind–body duality, In this latter case, it has been claimed, overlap of constitution cannot be applied to the identity of mind.
As Madell puts it: (mind and brain), when it seems possible and would make for a simpler thesis to test against scientific evidence, to explain the same events and properties in terms. · Dualism can be contrasted with monism, and also with physicalism.
It is argued here that what is essential to physicalism is not just its denial of dualism, but the epistemological and ontological authority it gives to physical science.
A physicalist view of the mind must be reductive in one or both iridis-photo-restoration.com · The Mind-Brain Problem. However contentious, the philosophical problem, as distinct from the physiological problem, can be stated quite simply as follows: What, essentially, is the relationship between events in the brain and those private, subjective, introspectible experiences that together constitute our inner mental life?iridis-photo-restoration.com · Dualism and the Mind-Body Identity Theory Michael Lacewing [email protected] Metaphysics of mind Substance: needs no other thing to exist Dualism: there are two sorts of substance, mind (or soul) and matter Mental properties are properties of a mental substance Materialism: there is just one sort of thing, matter Mental properties are properties iridis-photo-restoration.com · Web view.
· Identity theory is a family of views on the relationship between mind and body. Type Identity theories hold that at least some types (or kinds, or classes) of mental states are, as a matter of contingent fact, literally identical with some types (or kinds, or classes) of brain states.
The earliest iridis-photo-restoration.com